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Corporate governance has become a subject of heightened importance and attention in 
government policy circles, academia, and the popular press throughout the UNECE 
region. Various reasons explain the current prominence of what many persons might 
otherwise consider an arcane and technical topic. The recent financial scandals affecting 
major American firms, such as Enron, WorldCom, and Arthur Andersen, and the 
resulting loss of confidence by the investing public in the stock market have led to 
dramatic declines in share prices and substantial financial losses to millions of individual 
investors. Both the public and the experts have identified failed corporate governance as a 
principal cause of these scandals.  Since half of all adults in the United States own stock 
either directly or indirectly, corporate governance reform has become a highly charged 
political issue. The American Congress rapidly responded by passing the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002
1, which the New York Stock Exchange quickly followed by adopting 
sweeping new rules for listed corporations,
2 thereby effecting the most significant reform 
in U. S. corporate governance since the creation of the country’s securities regulation 
regime in the 1930’s. Viewing the situation in the United States with alarm, European 
countries, mindful of earlier financial scandals of their own, are examining their own 
systems of corporate governance in an effort to guard against similar abuses. 
                                                 
1Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, H.R. 3763, 107
th Cong. (2002). 
2 “Corporate Governance Rule Proposals Reflecting Recommendations to the NYSE 
Corporate Accounting and Listing Standards Committee, as Approved by the NYSE 
Board of Directors, August 1, 2002,” available at http://www.nyse.com. The new 
standards are subject to approval by the U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission 






Even before the recent scandals, significant efforts, propelled to a certain extent by earlier 
financial abuses, had been under way since the early 1990s within the OECD,
3 the 
European Commission,
4 and individual European countries
5 to understand the economic 
consequences of corporate governance and to formulate recommendations on appropriate 
governance structures and practices. In emerging market economies in Eastern Europe, 
experience over the last decade has clearly shown that successful privatizations and the 
development of vibrant private sectors depend to a significant extent on the existence of 
effective systems of corporate governance.
6 For example, the ability of “oligarchs” in 
                                                 
3 Organisation For Economic Co-Operation and Development, OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance, (endorsed by the Ministers at the OECD Meeting, 26-27 May 
1999), Paris, OECD, 1999, also available at www.oecd.org.  In the wake of the financial 
scandals in the United States and the growing international concern over corporate 
governance, the OECD Council at Ministerial level at its meeting of 15-16 May 2002, 
launched a new initiative to strengthen corporate governance.  Its final communique 
stated: “…the OECD will survey developments in OECD countries on governance in the 
corporate and financial sectors, with a view to identifying lessons to be learned and the 
implications for the assessment of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance as a 
bench mark.”  Available at www.oecd.org.   The assessment is to be completed by 2004. 
 
4 See Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, on behalf of the European Commission, Internal 
Market Directorate General, Comparative Study of Corporate Governance Codes 
Relevant to the European Union and its Member States (January 2002) available at 
www.europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/company/news/corp-gov 
 
5 In addition to numerous articles and studies, prestigious groups and organizations within 
individual countries produced over 30 recommended codes of best practices in corporate 
governance over the last decade. For a comprehensive listing of these codes and reports, 
see Weil, Gotchal & Manges, op. cit, supra note 4, at pp. 14-16.  
 
6See Alexander Dyck, “Privatization and Corporate Governance: Principles, Evidence, 
and Future Challenges,” The World Bank Observer 16, 59-84 (Spring 2001); Saul Estrin, 
“Corporate Governance and Privatization: Lessons from Transition Economies,” 11 
Journal of African Economies 28 (February 2002); Saul Estrin, “Competition and 
Corporate Governance in Transition Economies,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 





Russia to dominate and raid corporations and to engage in asset stripping and self-dealing 
at the expense of foreign and domestic investors was clearly due to systems of corporate 
governance that gave little or no protection to investors who were not insiders. Following 
rapid privatization in the Czech Republic, which gave insufficient attention to the 
protection of shareholder property rights, thousands of small investors sustained 
significant losses as “tunneling” by insiders stripped assets from privatized companies.
7 
 
More generally, the ability of countries to attract foreign capital is affected by their 
systems of corporate governance and the degree to which corporate management is 
compelled to respect the legal rights of lenders, bondholders, and non-controlling 
shareowners.
8 Individual and institutional investors will refrain from providing capital or 
will demand a higher risk premium for their capital from enterprises in countries without 
effective systems of corporate governance than from similar enterprises in countries 
having strong corporate governance standards.
9 One can also say that because of its role 
                                                 
7 Magdi R. Iskander and Nadereh Chamlou, Corporate Goverance: A Framework for 
Implementation p.2, Washington, D. C.: The World Bank Group, 2000. See generally, 
Roman Frydman et al., Corporate Governance in Central Europe and Russia (2 vols), 
Budapest: Central European University, 1996. 
 
8 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, Preamble: “If countries are to reap the full 
benefits of the global capital market, and if they are to attract long-term ‘patient’ capital, 
corporate governance arrangements must be credible and well understood across 
borders”, note 3 at p.12.  See also, Enrique J. Ruda-Sabater, “Corporate Governance and 
the Bargaining Power of Developing Countries to Attract Foreign Investment,” 
Corporate Governance 8, 117-124 (April 2000). 
 
9 In a survey conducted in 2000, investors stated that all other things being equal they 
would be willing to pay more for a company that is well governed as opposed to one less 
well governed. McKinsey & Company, Investor Opinion Survey on Corporate 





in capital formation, corporate governance has important consequences for economic 
efficiency and growth.
10 Effective corporate governance imposes a discipline on firm 
managers to maximize returns to the firm. With the movement throughout the world 
toward the expansion of private sectors and the creation of more competitive market 
economies, effective systems of corporate governance are seen as a key variable enabling 
countries to derive real economic benefits from these fundamental economic changes. 
 
Corporate governance also has diverse international implications. Companies that list 
their securities on foreign markets in order to gain access to new sources of capital 
subject themselves in varying degrees to the corporate governance standards of the 
countries where they are listed. In addition, one of the grounds upon which opponents of 
“globalization” have challenged multinational corporations, the prime movers of 
globalization, is that flawed systems of governance allow corporate decisions to be made 
without taking account of the interests of all “stakeholders,” other than those of corporate 
managers and shareowners. One recent study
11 has also concluded that important 
international economic disputes, such as those within the European Union over the right 
of state-controlled public utilities to remain immune from takeovers, or the tensions 
between the United States and Japan over Japanese bank debts, arise out of corporate 
governance problems. 
 
                                                 
10 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, Preamble: “One key element in 
improving economic efficiency is corporate governance, …”, at p. 11. 
 
11 James Shinn and Peter Gourevitch, How Shareholder Reforms Can Pay Foreign Policy 





In view of the current concern with corporate governance and its far reaching 
implications for economic activity, financial strength, and international relations, this 
Chapter considers the nature of corporate governance, the various models and forms that 
it takes in Europe and North America, and the challenges that it poses for economic and 
legal policy in the UNECE region. 
 
II Defining  Corporate  Governance 
The term “corporate governance” appears to have arisen and entered into prominent 
usage in the mid-to-late 1970’s in the United States in the wake of the Watergate scandal 
and the discovery that major American corporations had engaged in secret political 
contributions and corrupt payments abroad.
12  Eventually it also gained currency in 
Europe as a concept distinct from corporate management, company law or corporate 
organization.  
 
Scholars and practitioners of corporate governance give the term a wide variety of 
definitions. Economists and social scientists tend to define it broadly as "the institutions 
that influence how business corporations allocate resources and returns"
13 and "the 
organizations and rules that affect expectations about the exercise of control of resources 
in firms."
14 One noted economist has rather cryptically written that governance is “an 
                                                 
12 E. Norman Veasey, “The Emergence of Corporate Governance as a New Legal 
Discipline,” The Business Lawyer 48, 1276 (1993). 
 
13 Mary O'Sullivan, "Corporate Governance and Globalization," ANNALS, American 
Academy of Political Science 570, 153-154 (July 2000). 
14 World Bank, Building Institutions For Markets: World Bank Development Report 2002 




institutional framework in which the integrity of the transaction is decided."
15  These 
definitions focus not only on the formal rules and institutions of corporate governance, 
but also on the informal practices that evolve in the absence or weakness of formal 
rules.
16  Moreover, they encompass not only the internal structure of the corporation but 
also its external environment, including capital and labor markets, bankruptcy systems, 
and government competition policies. 
 
Corporate managers, investors, policy makers, and lawyers, on the other hand, tend to 
employ a more narrow definition. For them, corporate governance is the system of rules 
and institutions that determine the control and direction of the corporation and that define 
relations among the corporation’s primary participants. Thus the United Kingdom’s 1992 
Cadbury Report ‘s often quoted definition is: “ Corporate governance is the system by 
which businesses are directed and controlled.”
17 As applied in practice, this narrower 
definition focuses almost exclusively on the internal structure and operation of the 
corporation’s decision-making processes. It has been this narrower definition that has 
been central to public policy discussions about corporate governance in most countries.   
For example, the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance deal with only 5 topics: I. 
The Rights of Shareholders; II. The Equitable Treatment of Shareholders; III. The Role of 
Stakeholders in Corporate Governance; IV. Disclosure and Transparency; and V. The 
                                                 
15 Oliver E. Williamson, The Mechanisms of Governance 11 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1996). 
16  See, e.g., Alexander Dyck, note 6. 
 
17 Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (Cadbury 





Responsibility of the Board.
18  At the same time, as will be seen, countries within the 
UNECE region have applied and elaborated upon these narrower definitions in different 
ways. This chapter will focus primarily on the formal rules and institutions of corporate 
governance in UNECE countries. 
 
In the United States, corporate governance as a public policy issue originates in The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property, the classic work by Adolf Berle, Jr., a law 
professor, and Gardiner Means, an economist, first published in the 1932
19. Berle and 
Means examined the growing concentration of economic power in the modern 
corporation and noted the rise of professional managers having operational control of 
large corporations but little or no ownership of the enterprise. They also pointed to the 
increasing dispersion of corporate shares among a growing number of persons, who, 
because they were numerous, widely scattered and had relatively small interests, were not 
able to exercise control over the corporation they owned. This divorce of ownership from 
control in the modern American corporation posed a challenge to the interests of 
                                                 
18 The American Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and 
Recommendations (St Paul, Minn.: American Law Institute Publishers, 1994) takes a 
similarly restricted view of the subject’s scope. The product of fifteen years of study by 
America’s leading organization of lawyers, judges and law professors, it consists of over 
800 pages and purports to provide a comprehensive statement of corporate governance in 
the United States. It consists of seven parts: I. Definitions; II. The Objective and Conduct 
of the Corporation; III. Corporate Structure: Functions and Powers of Directors and 
Officers; Audit Committee in Large Publicly Held Corporations. III-A Recommendations 
of Corporate Practice Concerning the Board and the Principal Oversight Committees; IV. 
Duty of Care and Business Judgment Rule; V. Duty of Fair Dealing; VI. Role of 
Directors and Shareholders in Transactions in Control and Tender Offers; and VII. 
Remedies.  
 
19 Adolf Berle, Jr. and Gardner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property 




shareholders. Berle and Means viewed corporate governance (a term that appears 
nowhere in their book) as a classical agency problem: how could corporate managers, as 
agents of the shareholders, be induced to manage corporate assets in the best interests of 
their principals? 
 
Some scholars have come to dispute the applicability to countries outside of the United 
States of the Berle and Means model of the modern publicly traded corporation.  Finding 
that dispersed share ownership is largely an American and British phenomenon, they 
have argued that because large publicly traded corporations in other countries, for 
example in continental Europe, Latin America and Japan, are to a significant extent run 
by control groups with substantial equity interests in the firm, the basic problem of 
corporate governance in those countries is to protect minority shareholders from 
expropriation by controlling parties.
20  Share ownership and therefore voting power in 
publicly traded corporations is more concentrated in continental Europe than it is in the 
United States and the United Kingdom. In addition, a larger percentage of the population 
is shareowners in the United States than in European countries. For example, whereas one 
half of all American adults directly or indirectly own corporate shares, only one in five 
Germans is a shareowner.
21 
                                                 
20 E.g., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer,          
“CorporateOwnership Around the World,” Journal of Finance 54, 471-517 (1999); See 
F. Barca and M. Becht, The Control of Corporate Europe Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001;.Colin Mayer, Corporate Cultures and Governance: Ownership, Control and 
Governance of European and US Corporations (March 31, 2002) (unpublished paper, 
conference draft), available at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/cbg/conferences/us-
eu_relations/meyer_corporate_culture_governance.pdf.  
 





The statistical patterns that emerge with respect to the concentration of corporate share 
ownership lead to the conclusion that within the countries of the UNECE region there are 
basically two different types of publicly traded corporation: the “manager-dominated 
model,” which prevails in the United States and the United Kingdom, and the 
“controlling shareholder-dominated model,” which prevails in most of the European 
continent. While this difference in share ownership structure is real and has a variety of 
implications for corporate activity, a central problem of corporate governance throughout 
the region nonetheless arises out of the separation of ownership and control underscored 
by Berle and Means. That problem is how to protect minority shareholders from those in 
control, whether the controllers are professional managers without substantial ownership 
interests who would manage the corporation largely in their own interests, or 
shareholders with a controlling interest who would enrich themselves at the expense and 
in violation of the rights of the minority.  
 
The corporate governance problem identified by Berle and Means seventy years ago has 
not diminished in the United States since the publication of their seminal work. Indeed, as 
the ownership of corporate shares by American households, both directly and through 
financial institutions, has increased and spread dramatically throughout American society 
largely as a result of the privately funded nature of the U.S. retirement system, the 
principal concern of investors, practitioners and scholars of corporate governance in the 
United States has been how to protect the legitimate rights and interests of shareholders 




financial scandals at other large American corporations have re-ignited public concern 
with the question of corporate governance in the sense of how to devise systems, rules 
and institutions that will induce corporate executives to manage corporate assets in the 
interests of the shareholders, rather than their own. The spectacle of certain Enron top 
managers emerging from their bankrupt corporation with substantial financial gains while 
investors and employee shareholders sustained large losses has only served to highlight 
the problems posed by the divorce of ownership from control in large American 
corporations and to focus renewed attention on the need to reform corporate governance.  
 
Although the fundamental agency problem is still the same, what has changed since the 
time of Berle and Means has been the rise of institutional investors, propelled to a 
significant extent by the nature of the privately funded U.S. retirement system and the 
aging of the American population. The dispersion of share ownership, which served to 
render shareholders powerless, has been countered to some extent by the growing 
concentration of corporate shares
22 in the hands of mutual funds, pension funds, and other 
institutional investors who have shown increasing willingness to be strong advocates 
actively for shareholder interests and good governance within the corporations whose 
shares they manage. Institutional investors in the U. S. and the U. K. continue to view the 
corporate governance problem essentially as one of assuring that the corporation is 
                                                 
22 It is estimated that out of the total market value of all publicly traded shares of $30 
trillion in the United States at the end of 1999, $20 trillion was under some form of 






managed in the best interests of its shareowners.
23 Indeed, since fund managers are 
compensated by how well they maximize shareholder value in relation to a stated 
“benchmark,” they have powerful incentives to do so. For them, the principal focus of 
corporate governance is to define the relationship between the three primary participants 
in the corporation: shareholders, the board of directors, and company management.
24   
 
Many Europeans consider the traditional American definition of corporate governance, 
with its central preoccupation of protecting shareholder rights and interests, to be too 
narrow. For many persons on the European continent, particularly in France and 
Germany where share ownership is much less dispersed among the public than it is in the 
United States
25, the central preoccupation of corporate governance should not be the 
rights of shareholders in relation to managers, but rather the rights of the community in 
                                                 
23 Many institutional investors prefer the term “shareowner” to “shareholder.” The 
California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS), the largest public pension 
fund in the United States with assets of $143 billion and an active advocate of good 
corporate governance, has stated that  “shareowner” is preferable because it “reflects our 
view that equity ownership carries with it active responsibilities and is not merely passive 
‘holding’ shares.” California Public Employees’ Retirement System, Corporate 
Governance Core Principles & Guidelines April 13, 1998, available at www.calpers.org. 
24 Robert A. G. Monks and Nell Minow, Corporate Governance 1 (1995), define 
corporate governance as the “relationship among various participants in determining the 
direction and performance of corporations. The primary participants are (1) shareowners, 
(2) management (led by the chief executive officer) and (3) the board of directors. See 
also California Public Employees’ Retirement System, Corporate Governance Core 
Principles & Guidelines April 13, 1998, available at www.calpers.org., which explicitly 
adopts this definition. 
25    Rafael La Porta et. al.,  note 20.    See also, John C. Coffee, “The Future as History: 
The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and its Implications,” 





relation to the corporation itself.
26  For Americans, corporate governance is about 
shareholders controlling managers for purposes of shareholder profit (managerial 
responsibility); for many Europeans it is about society controlling corporations for 
purposes of social welfare (corporate social responsibility). Thus unlike Americans who 
have tended to separate issues of corporate governance from corporate social 
responsibility, Europeans have joined the two themes in discussions about how 
corporations should be managed and regulated.  The difference in definition and 
perspective on the nature and purpose of corporate governance makes it essential that in 
any trans-Atlantic dialogue on "corporate governance" the two sides recognize that at 
times they may really be talking about two different things. 
 
Strictly speaking, corporate governance is a matter of vital concern for all corporations, 
large or small, publicly traded or privately held. In practice, both in North America and 
Europe, the policy discussion on corporate governance has focused almost exclusively 
are publicly traded companies because it is in these enterprises that failures of corporate 
governance have the most serious and far reaching consequences for the economies of the 
countries concerned. For this reason, this paper will examine corporate governance 
exclusively within in the context of corporations whose shares are publicly traded. 
III  The Sources of Corporate Governance 
 
Discussions of corporate governance demonstrate two basic approaches to assuring 
managerial dedication to the interests of the corporation and its shareholders: the 
                                                 
26 Margaret M. Blair and Mark J. Roe (eds.), Employees and Corporate Governance 164 




regulatory approach and the non-regulatory approach. The regulatory approach relies 
upon formal rules and institutions backed by the coercive power of the state’s legal 
system. The non-regulatory approach, pointing to the costs of regulation, emphasizes the 
market mechanism and contractual arrangements, such the corporate control markets, 
incentive compensation schemes involving stock and stock options, and efficient capital 
markets, as means for inducing desired management behavior.
27  Both approaches are 
needed to achieve optimal systems of corporate governance, but an important question for 
policy makers is what is the appropriate balance. Until the recent financial scandals and 
their negative impact on securities markets, the non-regulatory approach had many 
advocates and even seemed be in the ascendancy. But the collapse of Enron has given 
new vitality to the regulatory approach as countries in North America and Europe focus 
renewed attention on shaping appropriate rules and institution of corporate governance. 
This paper is devoted primarily to a study of those rules, regulations and institutions. 
 
The rules and institutions of corporate governance come from a wide variety of sources, 
both public and private.  A primary source is the company or corporation law of the 
individual countries concerned. This legislation governs the creation, basic structure and 
primary rules of operation of the company, corporation, société anonyme, 
Aktiengesellschaft, or other corporate legal form that a firm chooses to take. It also states 
some of the basic rights of shareholders, including the right to vote, to receive 
                                                 
27 See, e.g. Ralph K Winter, Jr., “State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of 
the Corporation,” Journal of Legal Studies 6, 251 (1977); Michael C. Jensen and William 
H. Meckling, “The Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure,” Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305 (1976); Henry G. Manne, 
“Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control,” Journal of Political Economy 73, 110 




information about company matters, and to challenge management decisions in court. 
The nature of these rights varies significantly from country to country. Some countries 
within the UNECE region offer stronger protection to shareholders than others.
28   
 
In the United States, which has a system of federal law, each of the fifty states has its 
own corporation code. In addition, judicial decisions by state courts have developed 
important legal doctrines governing corporate behavior, such as "the business judgment 
rule" and the duties of care and of loyalty of corporate officers and directors.  American 
state corporation laws are very similar, but not identical. Indeed, the corporate laws of 
certain states may favor one interest group over another. Throughout the twentieth 
century, individual American states, seeking to maximize revenues from corporate 
franchise taxes, competed to become state of Delaware is the legal home to about 60 per 
cent of the Fortune 500 companies,
29 the state of incorporation for U. S. companies. A 
winner in this competition, the small America's largest publicly traded corporations, 
because managers consider Delaware law to be favorable to their interests.
30 As a result, 
                                                 
28 See Rafael La Porta et al., “Law and Finance,” Journal of Political Economy 106, 1113 
(1998) in which the authors evaluate the effectiveness of shareholder legal protection in 
49 countries and conclude that countries with the common law legal tradition (e.g., the 
United States and the United Kingdom) provide the best legal protection to shareholders 
and those with the French civil law tradition (e.g. France, Italy and Spain) provide the 
worst. 
29 E. Norman Veasey, “The Defining Tension in Corporate Governance in America,” 52 
The Business Lawyer 393, 401 (1997). 
 
30 Scholars do not agree as to whether Delaware law benefits shareholders or managers. 
For a review of the literature on this question, see Robert Daines, “Does Delaware Law 
Improve Firm Value?” Working Paper No. 159, November 1999, Center for Studies in 
Law and Economics, Columbia University, available at 
http://www.law.columbia.edu/law-economicstudies/abstracts.html#159. 




the Delaware courts have been the sites of important corporate litigation over the years, 
and their decisions have been influential in shaping various doctrines of corporate 
governance.
31 Traditionally, Europe has not had a competition for corporations among 
countries to same degree as American states, and European law has tended to inhibit the 
kind of corporate mobility experienced in the United States
.32  However, the creation of 
the single European market may be leading to increased freedom of European firms to 
choose their country of incorporation regardless of the place where they do business.
33 
 
A second important source of corporate governance are national rules and regulations 
with respect to the sale, distribution and trading of securities involving the public. One 
basic goal of securities regulation in virtually all countries is to assure that investors 
receive adequate information about the corporation and its activities so that they may 
make investment decisions and exercise shareholder rights appropriately. As with 
corporation laws and codes, the extent of protection afforded to shareholders by securities 
legislation varies from country to country. 
 
                                                 
31 Similarly, the state of Maryland is home to many mutual funds, largely because mutual 
fund promoters consider that Maryland law facilitates the launching and management of 
mutual funds.  
32John C. Coffee, Jr., “The Future of History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in 
Corporate Governance and Its Implications,” Northwestern University Law Review 93, 
641-651 (1999). 
 
33 See, e.g., Centos, European Court of Justice, Judgment of 9 March 1999, in which the 
court concluded that the Danish government could not prevent a private limited company 
formed in the United Kingdom by two Danish citizens for the purpose of avoiding Danish 
legal requirements on minimum paid-in capital from registering a branch to do business 




Although the United States has no federal corporation law, federal securities laws, 
principally the 1933 Securities Act and the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, as well as the 
voluminous regulations issued by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, are a 
central element of corporate governance for firms that raise capital from the public or 
whose shares are publicly traded. While still subject to individual state laws on many 
aspects of internal governance, publicly traded companies must at the same time respect 
the complex of Federal rules on a wide range of governance matters from informing 
shareholders about corporate activity to conducting audits of corporate accounts. The 
structure of federal law tends to give a high degree of uniformity to the systems of 
corporate governance of publicly traded corporations throughout the country. Federal 
legislation covering labor, anti-trust and taxation also have important consequence for 
American systems of corporate governance. 
 
The principal source of corporate governance in Europe is the legislation of the individual 
European country concerned. Although European Union legislation does have an impact 
on certain aspects of corporate governance, it has not unified corporate governance 
practice to the same extent as U.S. federal law and regulations, together with stock 
exchange rules, have tended to unify American practices. Thus, there is a greater 
divergence on corporate governance rules among publicly traded European corporations 
than there is among their American counterparts. 
 
In addition to the nature of the laws and regulations on corporate governance, one must 




effectiveness of corporate governance legislation and regulation depends of course on the 
competence, integrity, and forcefulness of the courts and regulatory agencies in the 
countries concerned. On this issue, there are also significant variations among countries.
34 
For transition economies in Europe, the development of effective securities regulation 
regimes poses a particular challenge due to their lack of experience, supporting 
institutions and trained personnel in this domain. Even in countries with a well-developed 
regulatory capacity, such as the United States, agencies regulating corporate governance 
constantly risk being influenced or “captured” to the detriment of shareholders and the 
public by the very corporations they are to regulate or by the political class that represents 
them. 
 
The rules and decisions of certain private bodies, such as stock exchanges, professional 
accounting institutions, and industry organizations also influence corporate governance. 
Thus the rules of the New York Stock Exchange, which are subject to approval by the U. 
S. Securities and Exchange Commission, are obligatory for corporations whose shares are 
traded on the “Big Board.”
35 In the wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the NYSE 
has adopted major rules changes on a wide range of corporate governance matters 
including audit committees, independence of directors, and the composition of boards of 
directors.
36  
                                                 
34 See Rafael La Porta et al, pp. 1141-1143, evaluating the effectiveness of enforcement 
in 49 countries. 
 
35 For the rules of the New York Stock Exchange applicable to listed companies, see, 
www.nyse.com. 
 






Accounting plays a vital role in corporate governance because it is fundamental to any 
disclosure regime concerning information about companies’ activities. A strong 
disclosure regime is essential for the exercise of shareholder rights, for the monitoring of 
corporations, and for imposing discipline on management.
37 But without effective and 
uniform accounting standards and practices, meaningful disclosure cannot take place. For 
example, the lack of agreement within the American accounting profession as to the need 
to treat stock option grants to executives as a current expense led to an overstatement of 
the earnings of some corporations, thereby inflating the value of their stock on securities 
markets.  As a result, the accounting rules and practices of professional organizations 
such as the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in the United States and the 
International Accounting Standards Board in Europe (IASB) are yet another important 
source of corporate governance.
38 
 
                                                 
37 “The corporate governance framework should ensure that timely and accurate 
disclosure is made on all material matters regarding the corporation, including the 
financial situation, performance, ownership and governance of the company.” Art. IV. 
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, p. 21. 
 
38 All United States publicly traded corporations are subject to the accounting and 
auditing standards set down by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). At 
present, Europe has no single, agreed set of standards. As part of its efforts to create a 
single European market in financial services, the European Commission has directed that 
by 2005 most EU listed companies should prepare their financial statements using 
international accounting standards, which are now being formulated by the International 
Accounting Standards Board, a private group based in London. By 2007, all EU listed 
companies are to use common international standards. David Tweedie, “Tackling A 







An effective system of disclosure also requires the participation of organizations and 
individuals with sufficient expertise and a reputation for skill and honesty to evaluate and 
verify the information that is disclosed. In making investment decisions, shareholders rely 
on these “reputational intermediaries” which include auditors, credit rating agencies, 
financial analysts, and the financial press, whose capital is the reputation that they have 
developed for integrity. These individuals and organization are considered the “gate 
keepers” of the financial markets.
39 While in most cases they are paid by the very 
corporations they evaluate, the market assumes that they have less incentive to 
misrepresent the facts than their clients since their reputations, their basic capital, is at 
stake. Nonetheless, corporate managers do seek to influence these intermediaries and, as 
in the case of Enron and Arthur Andersen, occasionally do so successfully. As a result, 
systems of corporate governance also need to address the regulations and incentives 
affecting the gatekeepers. One important dimension of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
and the recent amendments to stock exchange rules is to set down new regulations 
governing auditors. 
 
Within the limits of law, regulations and the applicable rules of private bodies, 
corporations have discretion to shape their own internal mechanisms of corporate 
governance, including the terms of managers’ contracts, the composition of corporate 
boards, and the internal structure of the corporation, to mention just a few. The degree of 
discretion varies from country to country.  The traditional legal mobility of American 
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corporations from state to state and the broad discretion afforded corporate organizers 
tend to reflect the basic “enabling approach” (i.e., everything is permitted unless it is 
specifically prohibited) of American corporate law, as compared with the greater 
restrictions on mobility and discretion in Europe that reveal a more “mandatory” 
approach (i.e., everything is prohibited unless specifically permitted) that seems to 
characterize European corporate law and practice. 
 
In order to influence the exercise of this discretion, industry groups and individual 
institutional investors have prepared codes, reports and statements of good corporate 
governance that they have presented to or pressed upon the management of corporations. 
In the United States, the Business Round Table, a leading organization of corporate 
executives, and institutional investors, such as the California Public Employees’ 
Retirement System (CalPERS) and Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association College 
Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF), have been active participants in this movement. 
In Europe, during the 1990s various committees of eminent persons produced over 30 
recommended codes of best practices in corporate governance, including The Cadbury 
Report (U.K., 1992), Viénot Reports I and II (France, 1995 and 1999), the Peters Report 
(Netherlands, 1997), and the Mertzanis Report (Greece 1999).
40  An important 
multilateral effort to define best practices in corporate governance for both Europe and 
North America is the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s 
Principles of Corporate Governance, adopted in 1999.
41 None of these codes and reports 
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has mandatory effect, but they have served to heighten awareness of corporate 
governance issues, to establish goals toward which corporations should work, and to 
frame and influence discussion of corporate governance policies. 
 
IV  The Objectives of the Corporation 
Any system of corporate governance must answer a fundamental question: what is the 
objective of the corporation and for whose benefit is it to be run?  The countries of the 
UNECE region appear to offer two different answers to this question. In the United States 
and the United Kingdom, the formal rules of corporate governance provide that the 
purpose of the corporation is to bring profit to its shareholders. Thus the American Law 
Institute (ALI), after considering various formulations to accommodate social needs to 
corporate purposes, finally concluded in its Principles of Corporate Governance: 
“…a corporation should have as its objective the conduct of business activities with a 
view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain.”
42
  
In other words, the purpose of the corporation under American law is to make profits and 
the beneficiaries of those profits are the shareholders. 
 
At the same time, following American judicial decisions on the point, the ALI’s 
Principles of Corporate Governance also states that a corporation 1) must obey the law to 
the same extent as a natural person; 2) may take into account ethical considerations that 
are reasonably regarded as appropriate to the responsible conduct of its business; and 3) 
may, but is not required to, devote a “reasonable amount of resources” to public welfare, 
                                                 




humanitarian, educational and philanthropic purposes, “… even if corporate profit and 
shareholder gain are not thereby enhanced”
43 (emphasis supplied)  Principles of 
Corporate Governance gives only general guidance for determining the reasonableness 
of resources devoted to such purposes. It asserts that one important factor is the strength 
of the nexus between the use of corporate resources and the corporation’s business, 
stating: ”In general the greater the amount of corporate resources that are expended, the 
stronger should be the nexus.”
44  Despite periodic challenges to business in the face of 
political and social events at various times over the years, the formal system of corporate 
governance embodied in the laws of the United States has unwaveringly and clearly 
stated that the objective of the corporation is to maximize profits for shareholders. 
 
In the United Kingdom, the objective of the corporation is basically the same as it is in 
the United States. English law makes it clear that the shareholders are the owners of the 
company and that a company’s board of directors is required to advance the interests of 
the shareholders as a whole.
45 Because of the centrality of shareholders’ interests to 
corporate purposes, the prevailing model in both countries, which of course share the 
common law tradition, is often referred to as the “shareholder model of corporate 
governance.” 
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Elsewhere in Europe, both law and policy recognize to varying degrees, that corporations 
also have the objective of advancing the interests of other persons and groups beyond the 
narrow category of shareholders. Such persons and groups, who may include employees, 
suppliers, creditors, civic organizations and the community at large, are usually referred 
to as “stakeholders.” 
46 As a result, these countries are said to have a “stakeholder model” 
of corporate governance. Their prevailing legal tradition is that of the civil law. 
Germany, with its system of codetermination granting employees a formal role in 
corporate governance, is often cited as the prime example of the "stakeholder model.”  
Generally, such a model of corporate governance gives stakeholders a "voice" in firm 
management and seeks to accommodate their diverse interests in deciding upon corporate 
action.
47 Another manifestation of the stakeholder model in European and Japanese firms 
is the “relational board structure,” which includes representatives of key constituencies, 
such as labor, lenders, and major customers or suppliers, whose positions on the board are 
a function of the corporation’s special relationships with those constituencies and are 
unrelated to any shares they may hold in the firm.
48  
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Debate about the relative merits of the shareholder and stakeholder models is long-
standing. Both have both strong advocates and resolute opponents.
49 Shareholder model 
proponents argue that the corporation is best able to create the goods and services that 
society needs if it focuses on its primary function, which is to maximize gains to its 
shareholders.  To force managers to deal with social considerations is to divert them from 
this task with a deterioration of results. They argue that stakeholder models undermine 
the notion of private property, enhance the power of executives by diminishing the power 
of shareholders to control them, and make corporate managers less accountable to 
shareholders. Professor Milton Friedman, a Nobel laureate in economics, condemned the 
idea forty years ago: “… few trends would so thoroughly undermine the very foundations 
of our free society as the acceptance by corporate officials of a social responsibility other 




Stakeholder advocates, on the other hand, argue that the corporation, deriving special 
benefits and privileges from the community, for example limited liability of shareholders, 
legal personality, perpetual existence and access to public capital, must as a result take 
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account of community interests in its decisions. As the American scholars Berle and 
Means wrote seventy years ago, 
“It is conceivable - indeed it seems almost essential if the corporate system is to 
survive - that the “control”  [i.e. management] of the great corporations should 
develop into a purely neutral technocracy, balancing a variety of claims by 
various groups in the community and assigning to each a portion of the income 
stream on the basis of public policy rather than private cupidity.”
51 
It is also argued that the stakeholder model facilitates the kind of long-term 
corporate strategy necessary for the welfare of the firm, rather than the short-term 
opportunistic corporate actions taken to satisfy shareholders in response to swings in 
volatile stock markets. In addition, the stakeholder model encourages beneficial 
investments in human capital by employees, suppliers and others to create value in the 
long run for the firm, investments that employees and suppliers would be reluctant to 
make in firms following the shareholder corporate model. On the other hand, it must be 
recognized that stakeholders will often exploit their positions to pursue their individual 
interests to the detriment of the firm. For example, the bankruptcy in late 2002 of United 
Airlines, the second largest airline in the United States, was due in part to the fact that it 
had the highest labor costs in the industry, a result attributable to a certain extent to 
worker representatives’ holding three seats on its board of directors.  Europe has also had 
its share of corporate scandals and failures. A shareholder model is no guarantee of 
effective corporate governance. 
                                                 





Although the debate between advocates of the two systems has gone on for several years, 
it has gained renewed vigour in the wake of the American financial scandals of 2002. 
Europe’s tendency to emphasize stakeholder interests may have allowed European 
corporations to avoid the head- long pursuit of maximization of shareholder value, the 
proclaimed goal of US corporations in the 1990s, which many persons think led to or at 
least facilitated the excesses of Enron, WorldCom, and other American corporations. 
 
The preference for the shareholder as opposed to the stakeholder model of corporate 
governance appears to have some basis in the culture and public attitudes of the countries 
concerned.
52 One survey of 15,000 managers and employees in twelve countries asked 
respondent to choose whether: (1) the only real goal of a corporation is making profit; or 
(2) a company, besides making profit, has the goal of attaining the well being of various 
stakeholders, such as employees, customers, etc. The two groups with the largest 
percentage of managers and employees selecting profit as "the only goal" were 
Americans (40 per cent) and British (33 per cent).
53 One may therefore conclude that 
among industrialized countries, national culture in America and the U.K. are closest to 
the ideal of shareholder value maximization as a corporate goal. On the other hand, it 
should be noted, of course, that despite the large percentage in relation to other countries, 
60 per cent of the Americans surveyed nonetheless considered that a corporation had 
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other goals in addition to making a profit. Consequently, it would seem that the 
prevailing cultural values in the United States may not be completely in accord with the 
U. S. system’s stated goal of corporate governance. 
In order to align the interests of managers to the goal of shareholder value maximization, 
U. S. corporations have increasingly compensated their executives with stock and stock 
options, now a widespread phenomenon throughout American corporate life.  As a result, 
management contracts and compensation schemes have become important instruments of 
governance in the modern American corporation. According to one study, the typical 
American corporation now allocates 1.4 per cent of its equity each year to executives and 
other employees.
54   In 2000, the value of options granted by America’s 325 largest 
corporations nearly equaled 20 per cent of their pre-tax profits.
55  In certain companies 
stock options have given an incentive to management to manipulate earnings through 
questionable accounting and other practices so as to raise their companies’ share prices 
long enough to sell their stock and thereby make substantial profits. It also leads to short-
term perspectives on earnings at the expense of longer strategies that might yield greater 
benefits to shareholders.  Equally important for managerial interests, stock has become 
the currency of corporate acquisitions and mergers. Thus a high stock price, presumably 
achieved to maximize shareholder value, also allows managers to substantially enlarge 
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European and Japanese lack of enthusiasm for the shareholder model, as opposed to the 
stakeholder model of corporate governance, is clearly reflected in the survey mentioned 
above. Compared to the 40 per cent of American respondents who believed that the sole 
goal of the corporation was to make a profit, only 28 per cent of the Italians, 27 per cent 
of the Swedes, 26 per cent of the Dutch, 25 per cent of the Belgians, 24 per cent of the 




The difference between the Anglo-American and continental European positions on 
corporate purposes may be explained to some extent by the greater emphasis placed by 
the former on the individual and by the latter on the community. In an extensive survey of 
individualism in 53 countries, one study found Americans to be the most individualistic, 
achieving an individualism rating of 91 out of a possible 100.
58  The cultural value of 
individualism, which accords the individual a central role in the scheme of things, is 
manifest throughout the American system with its emphasis on individual rights and the 
availability of individual legal remedies to enforce those rights. American law and 
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attitudes towards individual property rights and freedom of contract strongly reflect the 
American cultural preference for individualism. Transferred to the corporate arena, the 
law considers the individual shareholders as the “owners” of the corporation. As such 
they are legally entitled to all its fruits. The United Kingdom, sharing a common 
language, history, and legal tradition with the United States, also favours the shareholder 
model of the corporation. It had an individualism score of 89, ranking it third behind the 
United States and Australia. 
The European continent tends to emphasize the role and importance of the community 
more than does the United States. Europe’s emphasis on “social solidarity,” its skepticism 
about the merits of unfettered competition, and the formal inclusion of labour in 
corporate management in some European countries all reflect the greater importance that 
European culture attaches to the community.  American doctrines of “employment at 
will” and “freedom of contract,” both reflections of strong individualistic values, contrast 
with German concepts of “labour rights” and “good faith” in contracting,
59 which reveal 
strong communitarian values. This difference is also found in attitudes toward 
competition.  For example, in one survey whereas nearly 70 per cent of American 
managers believed that increased competition as opposed to increased cooperation among 
business would lead to greater benefits for society, only 41 per cent of German managers, 
45 per cent of French managers, 39 per cent of Swedish managers and 24 per cent of 
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Japanese managers had the same view.
60 In the individualism survey mentioned above, 
France and Sweden ranked 10
th with scores of 71, Germany ranked 15 with an index of 
67, and Spain ranked 20 with an index of 51. (Japan ranked 23 with an index of 46.)
61  
 
The greater importance of communitarian values in Europe would quite naturally lead to 
the belief that the corporation, as part of the community and benefiting from its position 
in the community, needs to take account of community interests, not just shareholder 
interests, in conducting its operations and distributing its benefits. The relative lack of 
dispersed share ownership among the public in most European countries, as compared 
with the United States and the United Kingdom, may reinforce this view.   On the other 
hand, there is evidence that the stakeholder model, and particularly co-determination, 
makes it harder for shareholders to control management and that European managers 
manipulate the stakeholder model by playing off one set of stakeholders against another 
in order to advance managerial interests.
62  For example, one study of corporate 
governance and the role of banks suggests that affiliations between banks and their 
principal corporate borrowers in Germany and Japan often encourage excessive lending 
and deferred restructuring.
63 
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The differing cultural views as to the objective of the corporation may account for some 
of the public protests against “globalization" that American corporations have 
encountered in Europe and elsewhere. Seeing the globalization movement led by 
American corporations whose declared governance system has the goal of seeking profits 
for shareholders without regard to other stakeholders, various groups are protesting 
against corporations that refuse to accommodate other stakeholder interests. A further 
point of friction may arise as a result of American institutional investors using their 
holdings in European and Japanese companies to press American notions of good 
corporate governance on European and Japanese managers. In November 2001, for 
example, the California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS), America’s 
largest public pension fund, allocated $1.7 billion of its investments specifically to pursue 
“active corporate governance strategies” in European and Japanese markets.
64 Good 
governance for U.S. institutional investors means the primacy of shareholder interests. 
Many multinational corporations are sensitive to cultural differences between the 
American and European views on corporate goals. For example during the 1990's, the 
mantra of "building shareholder value" was a proclaimed objective of many American 
corporations and was prominent in both their internal and external communications in the 
United States. These same corporations were much more circumspect in Europe, fearing 
that explicit statements in favour of maximizing shareholder value would antagonize 
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European governments and labor unions that strongly believe that corporations should 
advance the interests of all its stakeholders.
65 
 
While the differences between the stakeholder and shareholder models are real, care 
should be taken not to over emphasize them for several reasons. First, in countries with a 
shareholder model, the management and board of directors of the corporation are required 
to obey the law, and numerous laws (for example labour and environmental legislation) 
exist to protect persons from adverse corporate actions, even though such persons are not 
technically designated as “stakeholders” and even though such legislation does not fit 
within the rubric of “corporate governance.” Second, as will be seen, among the countries 
said to have a stakeholder model of corporate governance, there is wide variation in the 
extent to which such stakeholders actually participate in corporate governance. Thus, for 
example, in Austria, Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg and Sweden, the law gives 
employees, a key stakeholder group, in companies of a specified size, the right to elect 
some members of the company’s supervisory board. In Finland, on the other hand, 
company articles may grant employees that right. In France when employee shareholding 
reaches 3 per cent, they may nominate one or more directors, with certain exceptions. But 
in all other European Union member states, again with certain conditions, only 
shareholders elect members of the company’s board.  
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Third, there appears to be some convergence in corporate practice between the two 
models as a result of globalization and the listing by large corporations of their shares on 
the exchanges of other countries in order to widen their access to capital. The 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), whose member 
countries include proponents of both shareholder and stakeholder models, faces this issue 
in its Principles of Corporate Governance.
66   The Principles seek to bridge the gap 
between the shareholder and stakeholder models of corporate governance by stating in 
articles I and II that corporate governance should protect shareholders’ rights and should 
ensure the equitable treatment of all shareholders, but also stating in article III that “[t]he 
corporate governance framework should recognize the rights of stakeholders as 
established by law…”
67 The implication of this provision is that if a given stakeholder 
does not have rights established by law, the corporate management is not required to take 
account of them in its decisions.
 
 
Although American systems of corporate governance permit but do not require corporate 
boards and management to take account of social welfare issues in their decisions, 
various internal and external factors, such as pressure from labour unions, environmental 
groups, and non-governmental organizations, have induced corporations in individual 
cases to integrate social considerations in their decisions; however, this tendency by no 
means implies the kind of dilution of shareholder rights entailed by the extreme 
stakeholder model. Of particular note in this regard is the emergence of “socially 
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responsible investing,” by which investors instruct institutions managing their funds to 
take account of certain social criteria in making investment decisions. It is claimed that 
$2 trillion of U. S. investments in 2001 were subject to social responsibility criteria.
68   To 
some extent, this trend may represent a slight convergence of the differing American and 
European views on the purpose of the corporation. On the other hand, the growing 
influence of institutional shareholders and their increased assertiveness towards European 




V  The Institutions of Corporate Governance 
 (a)  In General 
The institutions of corporate governance include both those that are external and those 
that are internal to the corporation. The external institutions include government 
regulatory agencies, stock markets on which corporations list their shares, and the courts 
that enforce remedies for violations of corporate governance rules. Thus both the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission and the European Commission are in a real sense 
institutions of corporate governance. The internal institutions are the mechanisms within 
the corporation that determine how it is run. The external and internal organizations are 
linked since the internal mechanisms are to a large extent defined and determined by the 
external institutions. For example, law and governmental regulations specify the powers 
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of boards of directors and supervisory boards, the rights of shareholders, and the 
obligations of managers. Thus the participants in a corporate enterprise, particularly one 
that solicits capital from the public, are not free to organize themselves any way they like, 
but must follow rules set down by legislative bodies, regulatory agencies, and stock 
exchanges. At the same time, all external systems of corporate governance leave certain 
governance matters to the discretion of the corporate participants themselves. 
 
A fundamental and practical governance question for corporate managers, directors and 
lawyers is therefore: what matters of corporate governance are determined by external 
rules and what matters are left to the discretion of the internal participants? The scope of 
internal corporate discretion varies from country to country. For example, while Germany 
requires certain members of a corporation’s supervisory board to be representatives of 
labour, American legislation has no such requirement, thus giving U. S. corporations 
broader discretion in the selection of directors.   
 
Governance is about power, and the purpose of any system of governance is to determine 
how power is allocated and exercised. Within any publicly traded corporation in Europe 
or North America, there are potentially three institutional centres of power: 1. the board 
of directors or supervisory board; 2 the managers; and 3.the shareholders. These power 





(b) The Board of Directors and Supervisory Board 
In all corporate governance systems in the UNECE region, a board, selected by 
shareholders and acting collectively, exists to make key corporate decisions and to 
supervise management. It is a central institution of corporate governance. Yet important 
differences in board structure, composition and powers exist among countries. One 
significant structural element to be noted at the outset is that whereas the United States 
and the United Kingdom’s laws provide for a single board of directors, certain European 
countries, notably Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, and Denmark, require corporations 
of a certain size to have a two-tiered system consisting of a management board composed 
primarily of executives of the corporation and a supervisory board composed of non- 
executives elected by the shareholders and in some cases by the employees. The 
supervisory board selects the members of the management board and assures their 
accountability to corporate goals and governance regulations. In the other eleven EU 
countries, the unitary board prevails; however in five out of the eleven, a two-tiered 
system is optional.
70  For example, French law provides for such an option, but only about 
20 per cent the Paris Stock Exchange CAC 40 and less than 4 per cent of all French 
sociétés anonymes have chosen to create one.
71 Those that have opted for the two-tiered 
structure are primarily multinational corporations whose shares are listed on foreign 
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markets and which raise capital from foreign sources. They apparently believe that the 
existence of a two-tiered structure gives their system of corporate governance increased 
credibility with foreign investors.  
 
What the two-tiered system does is to separate the managerial and supervisory functions, 
usually combined within the unitary board system, into two distinct organs. The existence 
of a separate supervisory board serves to increase the independence of non-executive 
directors and to give them additional power in acting as an oversight body over corporate 
managers. In evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of the two systems, one study 
concluded: 
“The one-tier system may result in a closer relation and better information flow 
between the supervisory and managerial bodies; the two-tier system encompasses 
a clearer formal separation between the supervisory body and those being 
supervised. However, with the influence of the corporate governance best practice 
movement, the distinct benefits traditionally attributed to each system appear to 
be lessening as practices converge.”
72  
 
In varying degrees, all systems of corporate governance of publicly traded companies 
give the board a central position of responsibility. Article V of the OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance, states: “ The corporate governance framework should ensure the 
strategic guidance of the company, the effective monitoring of management by the board, 
and the board’s accountability to the company and its shareholders.”  The commentary to 
                                                 





this principle elaborates: “ Together with guiding corporate strategy, the board is chiefly 
responsible for monitoring managerial performance and achieving adequate return for 
shareholders, while preventing conflicts of interest and balancing competing demands on 
the corporation.”
73  Although the board has certain key managerial tasks, such as 
selecting and removing the company’s chief executive officer and approving important 
transactions, the fundamental task of the board in a publicly traded corporation is 
oversight of the corporation’s managers. In the words of one authority, the board’s 




Efforts in recent years to reform corporate governance have focused primarily on 
structural means to strengthen the board’s oversight role. In general, the challenge in 
designing systems of corporate governance has been to allow managers flexibility to 
conduct management operations in an efficient way but at the same time to establish 
processes that ensure managerial accountability to shareholders for accomplishing the 
stated corporate objective of profit maximization.
75  
 
If the board is truly to hold corporate managers accountable to shareholder interests, the 
members of the board must genuinely represent shareholders rather than management. 
Directors, of course, are elected by shareholders, but that process has traditionally 
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resembled an election in a one-party state: management controls the voting process and 
chooses a single slate of nominees, most of whom are managers or have close relations 
with them. In recent years, good corporate practice has stressed measures to give 
corporate boards greater independence from management in the hope that the board 
would, as a result, represent shareholder interests more vigorously. Rather than enact 
legislation on these measures, the approach in the United States has been to develop 
codes of best practices and then, through pressure by institutional investors, industry 
groups, and stock exchanges to induce corporations to adopt them. In countries that 
require a separate supervisory board, legislation requires that it members should not be 
managers. 
 
One principle that has found wide spread adoption in practice, although not in law,
76 is 
that a majority of the board of publicly traded corporations should consist of persons who 
are not themselves managers of the corporation. In 2001, for example, on the average 
board of Standard & Poor 500 companies 82 per cent of its directors were non-
employees. As part of the post Enron corporate government reforms, the New York Stock 
Exchange in August 2002 adopted a new rule,
77 subject to SEC approval, requiring that 
independent directors comprise a majority of the board of directors of all listed 
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companies other than those in which a shareholder or group of shareholders possess 
voting control. In Europe also, there appears be a growing trend to include non-
employees in corporate board membership and many of the European codes of best 
practice stress the importance of a board’s “independence” from management. In 2001, 
50 per cent of the members of an average board of a German DAX 30, 92 per cent of the 
members of the average board of a French CAC 40, 99 per cent of the Netherlands Top 




Not being an employee of a corporation is no guarantee that a director will be truly 
independent of management. A variety of other factors, such as family connections, 
financial relationships, and links to controlling shareholders can limit the ability of 
directors to act independently -- to be, in the words of the United States Supreme Court, 
“independent watchdogs.”
79  Independence is a subjective matter. In order to provide 
some objectivity to the process, one organization
80 has developed a set of criteria to 
weigh board member’s independence from management. They include: (1) not having 
worked at the company for at least the last three years; (2) not having personal financial 
relationships with the company; (3) not having familial relationship with management; 
and (4) not having a connection to major or controlling shareholders. When these criteria 
are applied, the percentage of boards with independent directors falls dramatically in the 
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United States to 69 per cent, in Germany to 50 per cent, in the UK to 39 per cent, in 
France to 25 per cent, and in the Netherlands to 7%.
81  
 
Ambivalence with respect to the independence of directors in the countries of the 
UNECE region is also reflected in the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. 
Rather than set a firm rule that the board must consist of a majority of persons 
independent from management, it merely states in Article VE. that: “The board should be 
able to exercise objective judgment on corporate affairs independent, in particular, from 
management.” To implement this norm, it recommends that  “boards should consider 
assigning a sufficient number of non-executive board members, capable of exercising 
independent judgement, to tasks [such as financial reporting and executive compensation] 
where there is a potential for conflict of interest.”
82 
 
The collapse of the Enron Corporation, a majority of whose board members were neither 
executives nor employees of the corporation, raises the question of whether still other 
mechanisms are needed to assure director independence. The failure of Enron directors to 
act as “independent watchdogs” may have been influenced by their social, political and 
personal connections to Enron management. 
 
Other structural devices that have been introduced to strengthen the board’s oversight 
function include the establishment of specialized committees to conduct certain key 
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functions. For example, as a result of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, all publicly traded 
companies are to have an audit committee consisting of independent directors. However, 
Enron had a specialized audit committee of independent directors but it nonetheless failed 
to detect and correct accounting irregularities.  Practice is also evolving whereby most 
companies have separate nominating and compensation committees. The basic thrust 
behind this movement is the belief that a specialized committee, known to the 
shareholders and particularly if composed of independent directors, is more able to 
perform these tasks effectively than if they are entrusted to the board as a whole, 
particularly, if that board includes representatives of management 
 
(c) The Managers of the Corporation 
If the selection of corporate directors resembles an election in a one-party state, the 
position of the chief executive officer (CEO) in the modern American corporation is like 
that of an autocrat. Indeed, like political systems dominated by the “cult of the leadership 
personality,” it is not unfair to say that most American corporations manifest “a cult of 
the CEO.” It is almost an article of faith of American business that the CEO, and the CEO 
alone, is responsible for the rise or fall of the corporation’s fortunes. Popular and 
managerial opinion in the United States considers that Lou Gerstner single handedly 
turned around IBM, that Jack Welch built GE into a modern force all by himself, and that 
Sandy Weill alone created Citigroup. CEOs not only manage. They write books. They 





In recognition of this role, American CEOs are paid extravagantly. The average CEO of a 
major American corporation received a record breaking $17 million in compensation in 
2000. According to Business Week, the average American CEO made 42 times the 
average blue-collar worker’s pay in 1980, 85 times in 1990, and 531 times in 2000.
 83 
While it is true that almost two-thirds of a CEO’s pay takes the form of stock options, it is 
also true that the average American CEO earns almost twice as much as his or her 
counterpart in other OECD countries. 
 
Despite effective performance on the part of individual CEOs, the American emphasis on 
the role and importance of the CEO may be attributed, at least to some extent, to its 
cultural value of individualism. Americans believe that organizational achievement is 
disproportionately attributable to the actions of the individual leader, rather than to the 
efforts of the group. From the Lone Ranger to Huckleberry Finn, American culture is 
filled with tales of the individual triumphant. In countries with a more communitarian 
culture, such as Germany and Japan, corporate management tends to be more of a group 
effort than in the United States, a factor that influences CEO compensation in relation to 
that of other executives and employees. Moreover, European and Japanese cultures with 
their emphasis on community values and their large number of family companies seem to 
give the European and Japanese CEO the status of a patriarch or father figure within the 
corporation, rather than the heroic standing that American culture gives to its own CEOs. 
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In view of the overwhelmingly dominant position given the CEO in American 
corporations, it is curious that both the formal and informal instruments of corporate 
governance have little to say about the CEO or other senior executives. Corporate codes 
and laws hardly mention them. The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, while 
devoting specific articles to the board and shareholders, contains no comparable 
provisions with respect to the obligations of corporate managers.  Informal statements of 
practice limit themselves to trying to create structures that will prevent or inhibit the CEO 
from dominating the board, whose basic function, after all, is to hold the CEO 
accountable. Thus for example, one emerging tenet of good corporate governance 
practice, advocated by certain groups, is that the CEO should not also serve as company 
chairman. Indeed, many advocates of good governance also favour a chairman who is an 
outsider, rather than a current or recent corporate executive.  It is interesting to note that 
while the concept of the separate chairman and CEO is prevalent in many European 
countries, it is not common in the United States. For example, in 2001 only 19 per cent of 
S&P 500 companies had this type of arrangement, while 100 per cent of Germany’s Dax 
30, 90 per cent of UK’s FTSE 100, and 100 per cent of Netherlands’s top 11 did.
84  The 
American preference for combining both offices is no doubt strongly influenced by its 
cultural faith in the heroic individual, as well as claims of efficiency made on behalf of 
this type of leadership. Perhaps influenced by their own belief in the cult of the CEO and 
their own cultural preference for individualism, American advocates of corporate 
governance have not pressed as hard for this structural division as they have for other 
corporate governance devices. 
                                                 








The very structure of shareholder ownership can serve to facilitate or render more 
difficult the task of controlling managerial behavior. The existence of large shareholders, 
often with seats on the board, a characteristic of European corporations, makes it harder 
for managers to manipulate the machinery of corporate governance in their interests, for 
example by controlling the nomination of outside directors or dominating the internal 
auditing process, than in corporations, such as those in the United States, where 
shareholdings are widely dispersed and directors, although nominally independent, do not 
have substantial share holdings in the corporation and may have social or financial 
connections to management.  Moreover, as long-term investors, large shareholders in 
corporation are in a position to check the tendency of managers to act opportunistically to 
raise the share price long enough to sell their holdings. The differing shareholder 
structure between the United States and Europe may explain in part why Europe in the 
last few years seems to have avoided the kind of failures of corporate governance 
experienced recently in the United States. On the other hand, Europe has had it share of 
corporate governance failures in the past, and the role of large shareholders has not 
always been benign. As indicated earlier in this chapter, one of the goals of effective 
corporate governance is to protect minority shareholders from abuse, whether from 






Some scholars have found that the reason for concentrated ownership of shares in many 
countries is the poor investor protection that those countries provide to share owners. 
Aware of poor legal protection, investors know that they must take a large equity position 
to be able to monitor management and thus protect their investment. Small investors, also 
knowing they have limited protection, are only willing to buy shares at a low price, a fact 
that makes issuance of shares to the public unattractive to the corporations.
85 The 
difference in retirement systems between the United States and continental Europe is also 
an important factor in explaining differing share ownership structure. The privately 
funded pension system in the United States encourages wide share ownership among the 
public, while the publicly funded system on the European continent doe not have the 
same effect. 
With respect to the legal rights of shareholders, in both the United States and Europe, 
direct participation of shareholders in corporate governance is limited to (1) electing 
directors or members of the supervisory board and, (2) approving certain items that 
require shareholder approval. In addition, there are legal rights accorded to shareholders 
to act against corporate officers and directors.  With respect to the first, a major 
difference between the U. S. and Europe concerns those countries, such as Austria, 
Denmark Germany, Luxembourg and Sweden, in which employees elect some members 
of the board. The effect of this concession to stakeholder participation is to reduce the 
influence of shareholders in the governance of the corporation in which they own shares. 
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With respect to items of corporate action subject to shareholder approval, there do not 
appear to be significant differences between U.S. and European corporations.
86   Within 
the United States, individual state laws grant shareholders, as owners of the corporation, 
the right to make decisions directly about certain key matters, such as mergers, affecting 
the fundamental interests of the corporation. The extent of these shareholder rights can 
vary from state to state and indeed from company to company by virtue of differing 
corporate articles and by-laws. The importance of these rights is seen in proxy fights for 
corporate control, most recently in 2002 in the battle between management and dissident 
shareholders of Hewlett Packard Corporation over approval of a $12 billion dollar merger 
between Hewlett Packard and Compaq, a battle that resembled a political campaign in the 
use of the media to influence shareholder votes. Corporate governance advocates are 
increasingly pressing corporations to grant shareholders the right to approve a variety of 
fundamental issues affecting the corporation, including stock options plans, and to have 
easy access to the proxy process.  Once again the thrust is to involve shareholders in 
certain fundamental corporate decisions as a check on management action. These efforts 
represent a further attempt to affirm the role of shareholders as “owners,” not merely 
stakeholders, of the corporation. 
 
Various legal rules may affect the ability of shareholders to take action against the 
decisions of corporate officers and directors with which they disagree. These include the 
ability to vote by proxy, whether or not cumulative voting (which increases minority 
shareholders ability to elect directors) is permitted, the right to challenge corporate 
                                                 




actions in court, the right to call an extra-ordinary meeting of shareholders and, perhaps 
most important of all, the extent of directors’ and officers’ fiduciary duty and duty of care 
to the corporation and the shareholders. Some studies have concluded that the common 
law legal tradition, which prevails in the United States and the United Kingdom, affords 
stronger legal protection to minority shareholders than does the civil law.
87 For example, 
the regulation of self-dealing by officers and directors is more stringent in the Anglo-
American system of corporate governance than it is on the European continent, a specific 




The legal rights of shareholders and the legal duties of officers and directors would have 
little effect on corporate behaviour without the existence of effective enforcement 
mechanisms. Governmental agencies have varying degrees of power to pursue 
enforcement against corporations, officers and directors, and they invoke them with 
varying degree of vigour.  But in addition, there is another powerful mechanism that 
probably takes its most vigorous form in the United States and has no exact replica in 
Europe: the private right of action.  The American system permits shareholders to sue 
directors and officers for injuries that they have sustained either directly by corporate  
action or derivatively, on behalf of the corporation, for injuries done to the corporation 
because of wrongful actions by its officers or directors. To facilitate such law suits, 
specialized law firms have arisen that carry forward the suit while assuming the financial 
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risks entailed by litigation. Their incentive is to recover “attorney’s fees”, a portion of the 
settlement that the corporation is judged entitled to. 
 
For many investors, the basic remedy and sanction for bad governance is to sell the stock 
of the offending corporation or not to buy it all. Nonetheless, particularly in the United 
States where corporate litigation is frequent, the existence of a legal remedy serves as one 
more factor, along with others, to exert discipline on corporate behavior. If the American 
style of corporate governance is to spread to Europe by reason of the pressure of capital 
markets and institutional investors, it must be asked whether shareholder litigation will be 
far behind. But without a culture that tends to favour private actions by aggrieved 
individuals, including shareholders, it is unclear whether private actions would evolve as 
effective deterrents to corporate misconduct in certain European countries. 
 
One scholar has argued that dispersed share ownership in the U.S. and the U.K. is a 
product of effective legal protection that encourages investors to become minority 
shareholders.
89  If true, then this legal protection for minority shareholders is itself, at 
least to a certain extent, the product of a cultural preference by U.S. and U.K. courts and 
legislatures for the values of individualism.
90  
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It may be difficult to transplant the U. S. shareholder rights model to Western Europe, 
where a tradition of equity holding by corporations from the same country and with ties 
to the CEO may stifle attempts by shareholders to curtail managerial decisions that they 
perceive as threatening shareholder wealth maximization.  
 
VI Conclusion 
Within the UNECE region, there are two basic models of corporate governance, the 
Anglo-American model and the continental European model. The two models are 
differentiated by several important factors discussed earlier. In very general terms, and 
while acknowledging exceptions to the pattern in individual countries, the two models of 
corporate governance can be summarized as follows: 
        ANGLO-AMERICAN MODEL      EUROPEAN MODEL 
       1. management dominated    1. controlling shareholder dominated 
        2. shareholder focused                   2. stakeholder focused 
        3. wide public share ownership                 3. narrower public share ownership 
        4. strong shareholder rights       4. weaker shareholder rights 
        5. unitary board structure                 5. two-level board structure 
        6. single powerful leader                            6.consensus or divided leadership 
         7. shareholder litigation culture                 7. weaker litigation culture.   
 
Models, of course, are merely intellectual constructs. They do not capture reality in all its 
complexity. Nonetheless, the seven elements indicated above represent important issues 




UNECE region.  Significant and powerful forces, such as the need to access foreign 
capital markets, the pressure of institutional investors, and the drive to create a single 
European market in financial services may tend to foster a certain convergence among 
corporate governance systems in the region. But systems of corporate governance are not 
simply forms that can be replaced with ease.
91  Systems of corporate governance, like a 
society’s other important institutions, contain its cultural values, values that it has come 
to believe, rightly or wrongly, are essential for social survival. For example, one cannot 
assume that American values of individualism will easily replace European attachment to 
community values. 
 
Continually stressing the dichotomy between the “Anglo-American” shareholder 
corporate model and the European stakeholder model, however, may exaggerate the 
differences between the two systems of governance and overlook the impact of forces 
making for convergence, such as the activities of U. S. institutional investors in Europe 
and the listing of European corporations on American stock exchanges. While a sharp 
distinction between the two models may satisfy those with a penchant for dialectic 
thinking, it may also lead to a neglect of opportunities to bridge the differences and fail to 
notice the extent to which convergence may already be taking place. For one thing, the 
effort to make management, whether American or European, more responsive to other 
parties outside of management itself can only serve as salutary discipline on managers. 
The movement throughout the UNECE region toward more independent directors is also 
a step forward, whether the goal of the corporation is seen as shareholder profit or 
                                                 




stakeholder benefits. The effort, now well advanced in Europe, to separate the positions 
of chairman and CEO, would probably be seen as beneficial by the shareholders of most 
American corporations. And finally a middle ground, a point of convergence between the 
stark shareholder model advanced by Americans and the extreme stakeholder model 
advocated by Europeans, may reside in the notion of   “socially responsible corporate 
governance,” a concept that seeks to bring together two important themes that really have 
not been joined thus far: corporate good governance and corporate social responsibility.  
Current discussions of corporate governance are taking place largely within the context of 
the developed economies of North America and Western Europe. But the subject of 
corporate governance is also of vital concern for transition economies. It should be an 
important element in their strategies for growth, financial strength, and productive private 
sectors, as they have learned from a variety of painful experiences, including failed 
privatizations during the 1990s. For the most part, the systems of corporate governance in 
transition economies remain works in progress.  As the countries in central and Eastern 
Europe construct their own corporate governance systems, they should examine carefully 
and critically the entire experience of both North America and Western Europe. Rather 
than leap to a shareholder or stakeholder model or hastily choose a unitary or two-level 
board structure, each transition state needs to determine the system of corporate 
governance most appropriate to its own individual needs and circumstances. 
Organizations and individuals from western developed countries inevitably press for the 
adoption by transition economies of “best practices” in corporate governance, best 
practices that have invariably originated in their own home countries.  Those best 




that may make their adoption by a given transition economy inappropriate or at least 
difficult without significant adaptation. In evaluating foreign models of corporate 
governance, policy makers in transition economies would do well to remember that to a 
large extent western corporate governance systems have evolved over time as a response 
to periodic, specific financial crises in individual countries. While recognizing that those 
crises have come and gone, they should also remember that others, leading to still further 
corporate governance reforms, are probably yet to come. 
 